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Faculty and Deans

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The criminal statutes that Mr. and Mrs. Nixon violated
make no exception for “mature minors” or for religious belief.
This Court could not, of course, carve an exception out of
these statutes based simply on the kind of policy arguments
that fill most of Appellants’ Brief, which are in any event
deeply flawed.

To uphold the Nixons’ appeal, this Court would

have to conclude that “mature minors” have a constitutional
right to exemption from any and all laws of the Commonwealth
designed to protect children.

Such a conclusion would be

unprecedented, unwarranted, and exceedingly unwise.

In

addition, the Court would have to conclude that in this case
the trial court was required to make a post-mortem
determination of Shannon Nixon’s maturity, based on the say-so
of her parents and members of their religious community.

That

result would be absurd.
Under Pennsylvania law, all parents have a vital legal
responsibility to secure necessary medical care for their
children, regardless of the children’s expressed wishes.

Mr.

and Mrs. Nixon chose to ignore that legal responsibility even
after having been convicted previously for causing the death
of another child.

This Court must ensure that this time the

Nixons, and all other parents inclined to flout this legal
obligation, get the message.
1

ARGUMENT
The new rule of law Appellants ask this Court to
legislate would be unprecedented and disastrous.

It would

encourage parents to pressure their seriously ill children
into saying that it is they who want to refuse medical care,
thereby adding a tremendous psychological burden to the
terrible suffering the children are already enduring.

The

Pennsylvania Legislature has imposed responsibility on parents
to ensure that their children receive medical care, and there
the responsibility must remain.

Mr. and Mrs. Nixon should be

ashamed for attempting to shift to their deceased daughter
responsibility for the choices they made about how to govern
her life.
What were the consequences of Appellants’ refusal to
fulfill their legal obligation as parents?

In its evaluation

of this case, this Court may not, of course, assume that
Shannon Nixon had spiritual interests at stake in the decision
regarding her medical care.

For the Court to do so, it would

have to declare the truth of certain religious beliefs, which
it may not do. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
593-94, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3101, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (“The
Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government
from appearing to take a position on questions of religious
belief.”)

In our society, the state does not make judgments
2

about individuals’ spiritual interests, whether or how they
will attain salvation, or whether they are right with God.
From this Court’s perspective, then, the only consequences for
Shannon of not receiving medical care were horrible suffering
and death.
The Court must therefore answer two questions: 1) Do
parents as a general rule have a legal obligation to prevent
such harm to their minor children whenever possible,
regardless of the children’s wishes and regardless of the
children’s age?

2) Do the religious beliefs of parents or

children diminish that obligation?

Under Pennsylvania law,

the answer to the first question is quite clearly “yes.” Under
the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the answer to the second
question is just as clearly “no.”

I.

PENNSYLVANIA LAW IMPOSES ON PARENTS AN OBLIGATION TO
SECURE MEDICAL CARE FOR A SERIOUSLY ILL CHILD, WITHOUT
EXCEPTION FOR THE WISHES OF THE CHILD.
A.

Appellants Had A Clear Legal Obligation To Ensure
That Their Daughter Received Medical Care.

Pennsylvania’s Child Protective Services Law imposes on
all parents a legal obligation to provide proper care for
their children.

It defines as child abuse -- a violation of
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legal obligations that can trigger loss of parental authority
and even termination of a parent-child relationship -- “the
failure to provide the essentials of life, including adequate
medical care, which endangers a child’s life or development or
impairs the child’s functioning.” 23 Pa. C.S.A. §
6303(b)(1)(iv).

There can be no question, and Appellants do

not dispute, that the Nixons’ failure to secure medical care
for Shannon was presumptively child abuse, and a violation of
their legal obligations as parents.
In addition, the laws of Pennsylvania make it a criminal
offense for parents to cause a child to die or otherwise to
endanger a child’s welfare by failing to secure necessary
medical care for the child. See 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2504
(involuntary manslaughter); 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4304 (endangering
the welfare of a child); and Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa.
Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 620,
538 A.2d 874 (1988), cert. denied sub nom. Barnhart v.
Pennsylvania, 488 U.S. 817, 109 S.Ct. 55, 102 L.Ed.2d 34
(1988).

There can be no question, and Appellants do not

dispute, that the Nixons’ failure to secure medical care for
Shannon was presumptively a serious criminal offense.
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B.

The Expressed Wishes of a Minor Child Not to Receive
Medical Care Do Not, And Should Not, Diminish
Parents’ Legal Responsibility

Throughout its laws governing children’s lives, including
the criminal child endangerment law and the Child Protective
Services Law, the Pennsylvania Legislature has identified the
terms “minor” and “child” with a person under the age of
eighteen. See, e.g., 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4304 (child
endangerment); 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5101(a),(b) (age for entering
contracts and for suing or being sued); 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5302
(custody of children); 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5501 (parental
liability for tortious acts of children); 23 Pa. C.S.A. §
6102(a) (abuse of family members); and 23 Pa. C.S.A. §
6303(b)(1) (i), (ii), (iii) (child protection).

Neither the

criminal statutes under which the Nixons were convicted nor
the Child Protective Services Law make any mention of the
wishes of children, whether “mature” or otherwise.

In

imposing a legal obligation on parents to secure appropriate
medical care for their children, the Legislature made no
exception for parents whose children are seventeen, or
sixteen, or fifteen, or any other age, and who express a
preference not to receive medical care.

The Legislature

imposed this obligation of care on parents until their
children reach the age of eighteen, period.

5

Appellants do not contend that the Pennsylvania
Legislature has created a “mature minor” exception to parents’
statutorily-imposed duties.
Court must create one.

Rather, they contend that this

Appellants advance two arguments to

support this contention.

First, Appellants argue that because

some other States have a mature minor rule for some medical
care decisions, Pennsylvania must adopt one for child abuse
cases.

Second, they argue that minors have a constitutional

privacy right that entails a right to refuse necessary medical
care and that obviates parents’ legal obligations.

Both

arguments are deeply flawed.

1.

Appellants’ claim that mature minors should be
able to refuse medical care rests on illogic
and a misunderstanding of the Court’s role.

Appellants cite to adoption of a mature minor rule in
certain medical contexts in some States, and contend that this
Court should legislate such a rule for child abuse cases.
Implicit in Appellants’ argument are the premises 1) that if a
mature minor rule is a good idea in some contexts, then it
must be a good idea in all contexts, and 2) that if something
is a good idea, then the courts of Pennsylvania must create a
law to implement it.

Both premises are false.

As Appellants state repeatedly in their Brief, some
States allow minors who demonstrate the requisite capacity and
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knowledge of consequences “to consent to” certain forms of
medical treatment themselves, without needing to obtain
parental authorization. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 11,
12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21.

The kinds of medical treatment

some States empower mature minors to authorize are principally
abortion, treatment for sexually transmitted disease, and
treatment for alcohol and drug addiction.

These are forms of

medical care those States believe can be very beneficial to
minors, but which minors might never receive if forced to
inform their parents of their situation and secure their
parents’ consent.

The legislatures and/or courts of those

States have therefore empowered minors to authorize these
forms of treatment themselves in some cases, so that they can
protect and promote their physical well being and preserve for
themselves an open future, an adulthood with a wide range of
opportunities to make a life for themselves.

The mature minor

rule is designed to facilitate placement of minors in the care
of medical professionals, who have a legal and professional
obligation to promote the minors’ welfare.
To conclude from these instances of authorizing minors to
consent to beneficial medical care that many States think it a
good idea to enable minors to refuse needed medical treatment
is to elevate illogic to an art form.

The mature minor rule

some States have adopted does not reflect a judgment that some
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minors should be empowered to do whatever they want with their
lives, or that some minors should be treated in every respect
like adults.

Rather, it reflects a judgment only that

sometimes it is necessary, in order for minors to receive the
medical care they need, to circumvent parental authority. Cf.
Parents United For Better Schools, Inc. v. School District Of
Philadelphia Board of Education, 978 F.Supp. 197, 208, 209-210
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (discussing the purposes of the Minors’
Consent Act, 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 10101-10105, and discussing
the rationales underlying minors’ limited constitutional
privacy right in connection with reproductive health care).
Appellants cite just two instances of a State ostensibly
allowing a mature minor to refuse medical treatment -- one
judicial decision in the State of Illinois, In re E.G., 133
Ill.2d 98, 549 N.E.2d 322 (1989), and one 1972 judicial
decision in Pennsylvania, In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d
387 (1972). See Brief for Appellants at 14, 22-23.1

Neither of

those decisions should influence the Court’s reasoning, as
explained below.

Oddly, Appellants entirely ignore in their

Appellants also discuss at length this Court’s decision in In re
Fiori, 543 Pa. 592, 673 A.2d 905 (1996), a case addressing the
patently dissimilar situation of withdrawing life support from an
adult in a persistent vegetative state. See Brief for Appellant at
24, 29-31. Appellants rely heavily on this case despite the pains
this Court took to emphasize that “our holding today applies only to
situations where the individual in question was once a competent
adult, but is now in a permanent vegetative state.” 543 Pa. at 608,
673 A.2d at 913.
1
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Brief a 1992 ruling of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania,
upheld by this Court, rejecting the mature minor defense in
circumstances similar to this case. See Commonwealth v.
Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988 (1992), appeal denied,
535 Pa. 673, 636 A.2d 632 (1993).
E.G., supra, the Illinois decision cited by Appellants,
involved a minor just under the age of eighteen who had
leukemia and who concurred with her mother in refusing blood
transfusions, for religious reasons.

The transfusions would

have prolonged the minor’s life, but “[t]he long-term
prognosis [was] not optimistic, as the survival rate for
patients such as E.G. is 20 to 25%.” 133 Ill.2d at 102, 549
N.E.2d at 323.

The Illinois court indicated that there is no

constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, for adults
or minors.

133 Ill.2d at 108, 549 N.E.2d 326.

But a majority

of the court discerned such a right for adults in the common
law of the State of Illinois, and without analysis decided to
extend that right to mature minors, simply because it could
not see any reason not to. 133 Ill.2d at 109; 549 N.E.2d at
326.

Certainly there are reasons not to, as discussed below,

so either the case was poorly briefed or the court chose to
ignore reasons proffered by the State.

In fact, the court

seemed quite confused as to whom it was according a right,
appearing to conflate the right of the minor with the right of
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the parent.

The court suggested that if the parent wanted the

minor to receive medical care, then she would have to receive
it. 133 Ill.2d 112, 549 N.E.2d at 328.

The minor’s “right”

thus appears not to have been much of a right at all.
Appellants concede that Green, supra, the 1972
Pennsylvania decision, is inapposite to the present case
because “Green dealt only with a non-fatal situation, not
health care decisions in life-threatening situations.” Brief
for Appellant at 23.

In fact, in Green, the medical care

decision was of little urgency, and on medical grounds alone
was a toss-up.

The Supreme Court found that it could not say

that the operation was required in order to protect the
welfare of Ricky Green.

448 Pa. at 348, 292 A.2d at 392.

Ricky Green had paralytic scoliosis, which caused a very
gradual deterioration in his physical condition, curvature of
the spine. 448 Pa. at 340, 292 A.2d at 388.

Doctors proposed

a spinal fusion to relieve the condition somewhat, while
cautioning Ricky and his mother that the operation would be
“dangerous.” 448 Pa. at 341, 292 A.2d at 388.
The Supreme Court first ruled, in a 4-3 decision, that
Ricky’s mother had a free exercise right to refuse the blood
transfusion, at least so long as Ricky did not disagree with
his mother. 448 Pa. at 348-49, 292 A.2d at 392.

After a

remand to determine whether Ricky did wish to receive the

10

operation, the Supreme Court ruled, two months shy of Ricky’s
eighteenth birthday, that the operation need not be performed,
since Ricky also preferred, in large part for purely medical
reasons, not to undergo the operation. In re Green, 452 Pa.
373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973).

It is not clear, then, that the

outcome of Green was based on any right of a mature minor to
refuse treatment.

Rather, the Court implied that Ricky had a

right to consent to treatment if he so desired, a right that
would override the mother’s religious objection to
transfusions.

And the Court simply concluded that Ricky did

not so desire.
In any event, the criminal provisions under which
Appellants were convicted were not at issue in Green, and
those criminal provisions independently impose a critical
legal duty of care on parents, one so important as to be
backed by criminal sanctions.

In addition, the Pennsylvania

Legislature passed the criminal child endangerment law between
the times of the first and second decisions of the Supreme
Court in the Green litigation, see P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1
(Dec. 6, 1972), and enacted the Child Protective Services Law
long after the Green litigation, see P.L. 1240, No. 206, § 2
(Dec. 19, 1990) (original enactment) and P.L. 1292, No. 151, §
1 (Dec. 16, 1994) (amending law).

The Legislature, although

undoubtedly aware of Green and cognizant that situations of
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that sort could arise with some regularity, chose not to
include a mature minor exception in either of these laws.
Cottam, supra, a 1992 decision of the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, was like this proceeding an appeal from a
criminal conviction of parents who, for religious reasons,
caused a child to die from lack of necessary care.

The

Cottams withheld food, rather than medical care, from their
fourteen year-old son, and he died as a result.

The Cottams

argued on appeal that they did not have a legal duty to
provide food to their son, because he was “of sufficient
intellect and maturity” to make decisions for himself and he
had “voluntarily refrained from eating based on their
religious beliefs.” 420 Pa. Super. at 333, 616 A.2d at 999.
The Superior Court granted that a child of sufficient
intellect and maturity “can assert her own religious identity”
in the very limited sense of being able to decide such things
as which of her parents’ different churches, in a post-divorce
context, she would attend – a decision of no consequence for
her health and well being from the state’s perspective.

420

Pa. Super. at 334-35, 616 A.2d at 999-1000 (citing Zummo v.
Zummo, 394 Pa. Super. 30, 574 A.2d 1130 (1990)).

But the

court stated categorically that children’s ability to assert a
religious identity in that limited sense “has no bearing” on
whether they should be permitted to refuse to eat, and “does
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not dispel [parents’] duty while the children are in their
care, custody and control to provide them with parental care,
direction and sustenance.” 420 Pa. Super. at 335, 616 A.2d at
1000.

The Superior Court therefore upheld the parents’

conviction.
In sum, then, precedent does not support Appellants’ plea
for a mature minor rule in contexts like the present one
involving refusal of needed medical treatment.

Appellants

also appeal, however, to this Court’s sense of rationality.
They suggest that drawing a line between eighteen year-olds
and sixteen or seventeen year-olds, in deciding when
individuals become fully in control of their own destiny, is
simply arbitrary. There is no significant difference, they
assert, between a girl on the cusp of her seventeenth birthday
and an eighteen year-old, so that if the Commonwealth allows
eighteen year-olds to make tragic decisions, it should also
allow sixteen and seventeen year-olds to do so as well. See,
e.g., Brief for Appellant at 25-26, 31.
One could argue, of course, that even an eighteen yearold should not be empowered to refuse necessary and effective
medical care, and that only after, say, age twenty-one should
individuals be able to make such a fateful choice.2

Eighteen

Indeed, this Court has indicated that, as is true is some other
States, in Pennsylvania there may in some circumstances be a legal
duty to secure medical care for a seriously ill adult spouse even
2
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year-olds, especially those raised in insular subcultures, are
typically just beginning to mature and are getting just their
first glimpse of alternative ways of life and worldviews that
are open to them, their first sense that they can chart their
own future.

But the Pennsylvania Legislature has made a

judgment that eighteen, the age at which most offspring leave
the sheltered environment of their upbringing to explore the
outside world, is a significant milestone in an individual’s
life.

It marks entrance into adulthood, a status that entails

the right to make (nearly) all the decisions about one’s own
life, foolish or otherwise.

On the basis of that judgment,

the Commonwealth does not permit persons under age eighteen to
do many things adults are permitted to do, such as purchase
tobacco or cigarettes, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6305, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §
6306; purchase or possess firearms or explosives, 18 Pa.
C.S.A. § 6110.1, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6302; have sexual relations
with other persons, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301; pose for
pornographic pictures, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6312; and purchase or
consume alcohol, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6308. In fact, the legal age
for purchasing and consuming alcohol in Pennsylvania is
twenty-one. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6308. None of these restrictions
on the freedom of minors contains a mature minor exception.

A

where the spouse expresses religious opposition to receiving medical
care. See Commonwealth v. Konz, 498 Pa. 639, 644-46, 450 A.2d 638,
641-42 (1982).
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person under eighteen cannot even get a tattoo in Pennsylvania
without parental consent. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6311.

Yet

Appellants contend that minors should have the power to refuse
life-saving medical care.3
Finally, not only are Appellants thoroughly unconvincing
in arguing that letting minors refuse medical care would be
good policy, but they also fundamentally misunderstand the
function of the courts in this situation.

Their lengthy plea

that this Court take notice of what other States have done is
simply inapt.

For even if statutes or court decisions in some

States did reflect a judgment that some minors should be able
to do whatever they want with their bodies, which they do not,
and even if that were a sound judgment, which it would not be,
it is, of course, not the office of this or any other court to
create an exception to duly-enacted statutes based on a
supposition that an exception would be a good idea.
Likewise, even if the Legislature acted arbitrarily in
imposing parental obligations until a child turns eighteen,
rather than until a child turns sixteen, which it did not, it
would not be for the courts to rewrite the Pennsylvania
statutes to establish a different age of emancipation.

In

In support of their position that mature minors should be treated
like adults in this context, Appellants also point out that the
criminal justice system sometimes treats minors like adults. See,
e.g., Brief for Appellants at 15, 18-20. But the criminal justice
3
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contrast, the courts in other States that have adopted a
mature minor rule, for purposes of allowing minors to consent
to treatment, were creating an exception to a common law
doctrine -- namely, that requiring parental consent to
treatment of minors. See, e.g., Belcher v. Charleston Area
Medical Center, 188 W.Va. 105, 116, 422 S.E.2d 827, 838 (1992)
(referring to “our adoption of the mature minor exception to
the common law rule of parental consent”).

Appellants’ call

for this Court to create a mature minor exception to the
involuntary manslaughter and child endangerment statutes is,
quite simply, misdirected.

2.

Children’s constitutional privacy right does
not and should not include a right to refuse
necessary and effective medical treatment.

Appellants contend, secondarily, that minors have a
constitutional right of privacy that entails a right to refuse
necessary medical care.

They cite numerous decisions of the

United States Supreme Court and of this Court recognizing a
constitutional right to privacy. Brief for Appellants at 2629.

That right, originally conceptualized as arising from the

penumbra of several constitutional rights, has more recently
been conceptualized as a substantive due process right. See,

system’s treatment of minors is motivated primarily by public
demands that have nothing to do with respecting minors’ autonomy.

16

e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851, 112
S.Ct. 2791, 2807, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992).

The constitutional

protection afforded in the cases Appellants cite does
encompass a right to substantial autonomy in matters
concerning one’s body and one’s healthcare.
All of the decisions Appellants cite, however, involved
adults.

And even in the context of decision making by

competent adults, the courts have not made the right
unlimited.

Most recently, in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521

U.S. 702, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997), the United
States Supreme Court emphasized, in holding that even
terminally ill competent adults do not have a right to
complete control over decisions concerning their physical well
being, that although “many of the rights and liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy
[this] does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and
all important, intimate, and personal decisions are
protected." 521 U.S. at 727, 117 S.Ct. at 2271.
The Court in Glucksburg held that States have a
commanding interest in preserving human life, even with
respect to terminally ill adults. 521 U.S. at 728, 117 S.Ct.
at 2272.

That interest is indisputably even more compelling

with respect to minors who can lead long, healthy, and
fulfilling lives if they receive proper medical care. Cf. 521
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U.S. at 731-32, 117 S.Ct. at 2273 (holding that States also
have an important interest “in protecting vulnerable groups .
. . from abuse, neglect, and mistakes” and in “protecting the
vulnerable from coercion”).

See also Walker v. Superior

Court, 47 Cal.3d 112, 139, 763 P.2d 852, 870 (Cal. 1988),
cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905, 109 S.Ct. 3186, 105 L.Ed.2d 695
(1989) (“Imposition of felony liability for endangering or
killing an ill child by failing to provide medical care
furthers an interest of unparalleled significance: the
protection of the very lives of California’s children, upon
whose ‘healthy, well-rounded growth . . . into full maturity
as citizens’ our ‘democratic society rests, for its
continuance.’” (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
168, 64 S.Ct. 438, 443, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944)).
Appellants correctly point out that children are persons,
and that children have constitutional rights.

But it is also

true that children’s constitutional rights are not identical
to adults’ constitutional rights.

See, e.g., Planned

Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2843,
49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (finding that States have “broader
authority to regulate the activities of children than of
adults”).

And they should not be.

In some respects

children’s rights should be greater, or simply different.

For

example, children have rights to education and to assistance
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from others in securing medical care, even though adults do
not have comparable rights.
latter right.

This case is very much about that

In other respects, such as the right to self-

determination, children’s rights must be lesser.

It would be

absurd, for example, to say that children’s rights relating to
sex or gun possession should be identical to those of adults.
In our legal system, individuals enjoy a right to fullfledged autonomy when they are presumptively competent to make
free and informed decisions about the many aspects of their
lives, including their healthcare.

The notion that teenage

children in general, including those being raised in an
insulated religious community and indoctrinated from infancy
to oppose medical care, are fully competent and free and fully
informed with respect to refusing critical medical treatment
is preposterous.

The trial court did not find any of these

things to be true of Shannon Nixon.4

And it would be absurd

for this Court to legislate that seriously ill children
expressing a desire not to receive medical assistance should
go through legal proceedings to determine whether they are
sufficiently competent, free of parental control, and informed
that they should be empowered to sacrifice their physical well
being, and indeed to give up their lives.
The Superior Court was therefore mistaken in characterizing Shannon
as a mature minor; the trial court declined to make such a finding.
See Brief for Appellant at 6, 22.
4
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In any event, Shannon Nixon never had the opportunity to
go through such a proceeding.

Mr. and Mrs. Nixon chose not to

inform public officials of their daughter’s illness until
after she was dead.

And, of course, as the trial court in

this case must have realized, it would be even more absurd for
judges to make post-mortem determinations of maturity, without
ever laying eyes on the minor, as Appellants asked the trial
court to do.
It would be offensive to deny children certain rights
simply because they are politically powerless or because they
have historically been treated with less than the respect they
are due as persons.

But it is entirely appropriate to deny

children certain rights when that is necessary to ensure their
healthy development into autonomous adults.
harm in doing so in this context?

And what is the

Should this Court conclude

that a sixteen year-old girl would be harmed by having her
life preserved against her will?
Court reach that judgment?

On what basis could the

Certainly none that does not

entail accepting the parents’ religious beliefs, or what the
parents claim were Shannon’s religious beliefs, as true, which
this Court may not do. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 593-94, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3101, 106 L.Ed.2d 472
(1989).

20

On the other hand, conferring this right on minors would
have tremendous costs – more suffering, more life-long
impairments, and more loss of young lives.

And presumably the

right would be operative to the same degree in cases where
parents wanted their child to receive medical care.

A minor

would be no less mature simply because she disagrees with her
parents; in fact, disagreement might signal greater
independence.

And there are many reasons why a teenager might

decide she does not want to undergo a medical procedure,
including reasons having nothing to do with the efficacy of
the procedure, and courts would be hard-pressed to say that
those reasons are less rational than religious belief.
Moreover, if a minor is entitled to decide that she will
not receive necessary medical care, would she not also be
entitled to make the less fateful decisions to smoke, consume
alcohol, and pose for pornographic pictures?
position leads ineluctably to that result.

Appellants’
“The mere novelty

of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that `substantive
due process’ sustains it.”

Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303,

113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993).
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II.

THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF APPELLANTS, AND THE ALLEGED
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF THEIR DAUGHTER, IN NO WAY DIMINISHED
APPELLANTS’ LEGAL OBLIGATION AS PARENTS OR THEIR CRIMINAL
LIABILITY FOR FAILING TO FULFILL THAT OBLIGATION.
Appellants do not explicitly advance a claim of religious

freedom, for themselves or for their deceased daughter. Yet
they repeatedly emphasize that their objection to medical
care, and the alleged objection of Shannon Nixon to medical
care, were based upon religious beliefs.

At one point they do

go so far as to assert that Shannon’s “conscious choice” was
“founded upon her constitutional right to exercise her
religion.” Brief for Appellants at 31.

They undoubtedly hope

that this Court will be influenced by the religious dimension
of their case, even though they have asserted no legal claim
on that basis.

Lest there be any uncertainty, such a claim

would be unsupportable.

Neither the religious beliefs of

Appellants nor the alleged religious beliefs of their daughter
in any way diminished the legal obligation Appellants had to
secure medical care for Shannon.

A.

Appellants’ Religious Beliefs Did Not Lessen Their
Legal Obligation.

The criminal statutes under which the Nixons were
convicted contain no mention of spiritual treatment or
religious beliefs.

The Pennsylvania Legislature has not
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created an exemption from criminal liability for involuntary
manslaughter or child endangerment for parents whose religious
beliefs conflict with their legal duties.

Nor could it do so

consistent with the United States Constitution.

Application

of these laws in the context of child rearing is an important
legal protection for children, and to deny that protection to
certain children, simply to accommodate the religious
preferences of parents, would violate the Fourteenth Amendment
right of those children to equal protection of the law. See
State v. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc.2d 43, 46-47, 490 N.E.2d 931,
935-36 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1984)(invalidating on equal
protection grounds a religious exemption to Ohio’s medical
neglect law); Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1979)
(striking down on equal protection grounds a religious
exemption to a state law requiring vaccination of all school
children); Dwyer, “The Children We Abandon: Religious
Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of
Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors,” 74 N.C.
L.Rev. 1321 (1996).
In addition, this Court has upheld a decision of the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania decreeing that the Free
Exercise Clause in no way compels the state to create any
exemption from, or to diminish liability under, its
involuntary manslaughter or child endangerment statutes for
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parents who oppose medical care for their children on
religious grounds. Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa.Super. 10,
22-26, 497 A.2d 616, 623-26 (Pa. 1985), appeal denied, 517 Pa.
620, 538 A.2d 874. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
230, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1540, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (emphasizing,
in holding that Amish parents were entitled to an exemption
from State compulsory school attendance laws, that the Court
believed this would not result in any harm to the children);
Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 278 F.Supp. 488
(W.D. Wash. 1967), affirmed per curiam, 390 U.S. 598, 88 S.Ct.
1260, 20 L.Ed.2d 158 (1968)(ordering blood transfusions for
child over religious objection of Jehovah’s Witness parents);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170, 64 S.Ct. 438, 444,
88 L.Ed. 645 (1944) (“Parents may be free to become martyrs
themselves.

But it does not follow they are free . . . to

make martyrs of their children before they have reached the
age of full and legal discretion when they can make that
choice for themselves.”).

Though Appellants do not cite

Barnhart in their Brief, it may explain why they do not claim
that they had any right, as a matter of religious freedom, to
do what they did.
Pennsylvania’s Child Protective Services Law does contain
a special provision for situations of this kind, but that
provision in no way exempts any parents from the legal
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obligation to take steps leading to medical care for a sick
child.

23 Pa. C.S.A. § 6303 provides:

If, upon investigation, the county agency determines
that a child has not been provided needed medical
care or surgical care because of seriously held
religious beliefs of the child’s parents, guardian
or person responsible for the child’s welfare, which
beliefs are consistent with those of a bona fide
religion, the child shall not be deemed to be
physically or mentally abused. The county agency
shall closely monitor the child and shall seek
court-ordered medical intervention when the lack of
medical or surgical care threatens the child’s life
or long-term health. In cases involving religious
circumstances, all correspondence with a subject of
the report and the records of the Department of
Public Welfare and the county agency shall not
reference “child abuse” and shall acknowledge the
religious basis for the child’s condition, and the
family shall be referred for general protective
services, if appropriate. (emphasis added)
The clear purpose of this statutory provision is to
ensure that children in these situations do receive medical
care, despite the religious views of their parents, while at
the same time accommodating parents just to the extent of
relieving them of the need to sign medical authorization
forms.

The provision begins by stating that parents will not

be deemed abusive if the county agency investigates and makes
a certain determination.

This presupposes that the county

agency has been made aware of the child’s illness, and in
sufficient time for it to “closely monitor the child and . . .
seek court-ordered medical intervention when the lack of
medical or surgical care threatens the child’s life or long-
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term health.”

A county agency can secure a judicial order of

treatment in any case “where harm to the physical or mental
health of the child [from non-treatment] is demonstrated.” In
re Cabrera, 381 Pa.Super. 100, 108, 552 A.2d 1114, 1118
(1989).
Thus, parents whose religious beliefs preclude them from
authorizing medical care are not abusive under the Child
Protective Services Law if, and only if, they timely report
the child’s illness to the county, so that the county can
investigate and take the statutorily mandated actions.

In

other words, parents who are religiously opposed to medical
care have a legal duty either to bring their sick child to a
doctor themselves or to ensure that the county agency is
promptly informed of the child’s illness. The Nixons did
neither.

As a result, the county agency was never able to

investigate and take the statutorily mandated actions, and
this provision is therefore inapplicable.
In sum, the religious beliefs of Appellants themselves
are entirely irrelevant to this case.

This Court must look

upon them just as it would parents who failed to secure
medical care for their dying daughter because they were simply
uncaring.

The fact that they had certain religious beliefs

did not in any way diminish their legal responsibility.
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B.

A Minor’s Religious Beliefs Do Not Affect Parents’
Legal Obligation to Secure Necessary Medical Care.

As noted above, the criminal statutes under which
Appellants were convicted make no mention of children’s wishes
nor of anyone’s religious beliefs, and the Child Protective
Services Law also says nothing about children’s wishes,
whether religiously based or otherwise.

One can reasonably

infer from this silence a legislative judgment not to create
an exception to these critical child protective provisions for
cases where children express agreement with their parents’
religious beliefs.

Therefore, to attribute significance to

the fact that Shannon Nixon’s alleged desire not to receive
medical treatment was based upon religious belief, rather than
upon some other kind of belief or motive, Appellants would
have to argue that minors have a First Amendment right to a
religious exemption from the general rule that they must
receive medical care when they are seriously ill.
Such an argument would fail.

Even adults do not have a

First Amendment right to a religious exemption from generally
applicable laws mandating that they receive certain forms of
healthcare. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (holding that generally
applicable laws that are formally neutral as to religion are
not subject to Free Exercise Clause challenge even if they
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disparately impact persons with particular religious beliefs);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed.
643 (1905) (rejecting an adult’s Free Exercise Clause
objection to mandatory vaccination). So even if minors’
espousal of religious beliefs should receive the same weight
as the religious convictions of adults, a view no court or
legislature in this country has adopted, the Free Exercise
Clause would not confer on them a right to refuse medical care
that State law otherwise requires them to receive.

If the

Free Exercise Clause does not require States to create a
religious exemption to laws, such as the law prohibiting use
of peyote at issue in Smith, supra, that are designed in part
to prevent adults from harming themselves, then it surely does
not require States to create religious exemptions from laws
designed to prevent children from harming themselves.
Recognizing a free exercise right of minors to refuse
critical medical care would have unacceptable consequences.
It would encourage parents with religious objections to
medical care to apply heavy pressure on their sick or injured
children to express agreement with the parents’ beliefs.
Parents would have an enormous incentive to do whatever it
takes to make their children insist to public authorities that
it is really they, the children, who want to refuse treatment
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for their disease or injury -- namely, avoiding a substantial
jail sentence.
And what good would come of such a rule?

Teenagers would

be able to effectuate life-threatening choices based on
inherited beliefs.

Is that such a great good that it should

override the good of protecting their basic welfare until they
arrive at adulthood, when they will be free to make their own
way in life?

Courts throughout the country have on many

occasions ordered medical care for minors over the objection
of parents and over objections of the minors as well.

It

seems highly unlikely that when those minors reach adulthood
they wish that they had suffered permanent impairment, or that
they had died, rather than receiving medical treatment
contrary to the religious beliefs they held at the time.
In any event, as noted above, Appellants have advanced no
claim based on religious freedom, for themselves or for their
daughter.

Therefore, this Court must look upon Shannon Nixon

just as it would upon a sixteen year-old whose parents allege
that she decided for some other non-medical reason (e.g., she
realized she could never have the career of her dreams) not to
receive medical treatment for a serious illness.

The Court’s

decision will necessarily govern situations of that kind as
well.
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CONCLUSION
One purpose of criminal sentencing is to impress upon
persons convicted of crimes the wrongfulness and harmfulness
of their actions, so they will take responsibility for what
they have done and commit themselves to altering their conduct
in the future.

The line of argument Appellants have taken in

this appeal of their convictions makes clear that they have
not accepted responsibility for their choices and actions.
That Shannon was the second child the Nixons caused to die
unnecessarily makes this even clearer.

By rejecting their

appeal in no uncertain terms, this Court can send the message
to Appellants that they cannot with impunity flout the laws of
the Commonwealth and their legal responsibilities as parents.
Therefore, amici curiae Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal
Duty,

Inc.;

the

American

Humane

Association,

Children’s

Division; the National Association of Counsel for Children;
and

the

National

Exchange

Club

Foundation

respectfully

that this Court uphold the decision of the Superior Court.
Respectfully submitted:
_______________________
James G. Dwyer, Esq.
Attorney for Amici Curiae
CHILD, American Humane
Association, National
Association of Counsel for
Children, and the National
Exchange Club Foundation
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